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Prediction1 is an omnipresent principle of human behavior that can be fostered by predictability
in the environment. We regard prediction as the mental representation of future event states
or anticipated action consequences, and predictability as a property of certain events in the
environment. On the assumption that predictability and prediction are beneficial for any kind
of behavior, we argue that their benefits to relieving the human system are most evident
when encountering multiple tasks. However, we predicate that their impact on multitasking is
understudied and so we aim at dissociating prediction and predictability within multitasking
contexts and at outlining different sources of predictability that have not been conflated under this
term so far. From our opinion it follows that future multitasking research requires experimental
designs and analyses that consider and unveil principles of prediction and the impact of
predictability on multitasking performance.
OMNIPRESENCE OF PREDICTION ACCORDING TO PREDICTIVE
CODING PRINCIPLES
Blakemore et al. (2000) proposed that it is impossible to tickle oneself, because there is no difference
between predicted sensory consequences of one’s forward model and the actually experienced
sensory consequences. This means that there is entirely no surprise, which is tantamount to a
prediction error of zero. In a general sense, people predict the effect of an action without necessarily
being aware of it (Wolpert et al., 2003), and, according to ideomotor theory, also initiate voluntary
actions by the prediction of their effects.
Neurosciences have encouraged the idea of interpreting the cognitive system as a predictive
coding machine, with the brain being seen as an anticipation device or feedforward processing
machine (Bubic et al., 2010). Likewise, Friston (2010) has proposed the free energy principle, arguing
that organisms try to counteract disorder by avoiding surprise (minimizing free energy). According
to this principle, our internal states represent what has most likely caused a sensation, and we
do not only try to evaluate these hypotheses in the external world, but permanently update them
depending on the extent of the prediction error. The better the fit between internal and external
state, the lower the free energy (Clark, 2013). The most important implication is that organisms
1Prediction is equated with anticipation and expectation (Northoff, 2014, p. 146).
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have no need to search for regularities in the environment, but
rather automatically adapt to them as a consequence of the
continuous updating of representations about the external world
due to the prediction error. Independent of specificmodels across
disciplines, there is some agreement that these predictions are
made outside of awareness, and we only become aware of them
when they are violated and feelings of surprise draw attention
to them (Whittlesea, 2004). However, it has been suggested that
conscious predictions occur concurrently and independent from
unaware predictions (Perruchet et al., 2006).
Accepting prediction as a permanently ongoing process of
the cognitive and motor system, plus accepting multitasking as
intrinsic part of both systems, implies that prediction should
also leave its traces on multitasking. Multitasking paradigms,
as typical testbeds for the capabilities and limits of motor-
cognitive interaction, should therefore be eminently suitable
to showcase that prediction and predictability matters for
performance. For instance, prediction errors cannot decrease
when different tasks are paired at random, when tasks are
unpredictably sequenced or when different probabilities violate
expectations about upcoming tasks. In contrast, predictability
in task-environments, allowing people to develop predictions
about tasks, stimuli or motor requirements, attenuate prediction
errors, and ameliorate multitasking performance, which we will
exemplify below.
SOURCES OF PREDICTABILITY IN
MULTITASKING SETTINGS
Multitasking refers to task requirements in which cognitive
processes involved in performing two (or more) tasks overlap
in time, and it is typically investigated in dual-task or
task-switching paradigms. Usually, multitasking is related to
performance costs that manifest in increased reaction times
for the second task or task switches and have for instance
been explained by structural bottlenecks or the exhaustion of
overall capacity limits (for overviews see Kiesel et al., 2010;
Fischer and Plessow, 2015). Besides examining multitasking
costs, one endeavor of multitasking research is the identification
of sources fostering interference-reduction. We suggest that
one major contributor to this is predictability in its various
forms.
SEQUENTIAL STRUCTURES
Dual-task studies suggest that people automatically use events
(i.e., stimuli/responses) in one task to predict events in the
other task (Jiménez and Méndez, 2001). While automatic
prediction of elements in Task-A, based on elements in Task-B,
disrupts sequence learning when one task is random, fast
reactions and implicit sequence learning are preserved when
stimuli and responses in both tasks are arranged such that
predictive relationships between task elements hold (Keele
et al., 2003; Röttger et al., 2017). In general, results from
dual-task sequence learning studies suggest that prediction
occurs automatically and is per default not depending on task
boundaries.
Similarly, task switching studies suggest that people
can acquire implicit knowledge about the sequences of
tasks (Heuer et al., 2001; Koch, 2001). In task-switching
setups where, unbeknownst to participants, tasks follow a
regularly repeating sequence, participants respond faster as
compared to baseline conditions where tasks switch randomly.
Presumably, automatic prediction based on implicit task-
sequence knowledge fosters the preparation of the upcoming
task set.
TIME CONTINGENCY
Other than enhancing predictability by structuring events or
tasks, recent accounts have investigated the impact of interval
durations between tasks, assuming that the temporal distribution
of tasks may carry information about which task will occur.
To investigate whether participants adapt to regularities of
waiting time and task requirements, Aufschnaiter et al. (2017)
employed a setting in which inter-task delays predicted the
task type in the upcoming trial with different probabilities
(70, 80, and 90%). Participants responded faster to frequent
than to infrequent delay-task combinations for all tested
degrees of predictability and both, task switches and repetitions,
benefited from the predictability of time to task. Again, there
is evidence for the omnipresence of prediction, as participants
did not become aware of the predictive value of the interval
duration.
EXPLICIT CUES
In contrast to implicit predictability based on sequences or time,
other studies manipulated predictability by providing explicit
task cues that precede the imperative target stimuli (Meiran,
1996). Typically, these studies manipulate the duration of the
interval between cue and imperative stimulus to investigate
processes of task preparation (Kiesel et al., 2010), hypothesizing
that longer preparation equals better prediction. They provide
accumulative evidence that prolonging cue-stimulus intervals
leads to reduced switch costs, indicating that switches benefit
more from longer preparation times than repetitions (Logan and
Bundesen, 2004), and that this effect is even more pronounced
when additional cues are provided during preparation time
(Koch, 2003).
Some studies also manipulated validity of explicit cues. In
most studies, the cue predicts the task deterministically (100%
valid), and any cue-based preparation will always be correct.
However, in real life multitasking, cues often involve some degree
of uncertainty, predicting tasks only probabilistically. Those
few studies employing probabilistic cues observed preparation
in terms of better performance for valid than invalid trials
(Dreisbach et al., 2002; Wendt et al., 2012). Yet, results
are inconclusive regarding preparation effects in switch and
repetition trials (Dreisbach et al., 2002) vs. switch trials only
(Wendt et al., 2012).
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SENSORIMOTOR CUES
In addition to external cues that precede the imperative stimulus,
the system itself is capable of providing predictive sensorimotor
cues prior to executing an action. Sensory signals and motor
commands both provide useful information to reinforce internal
forward models, capturing the causal link between actions
and their sensory consequences. So, relevant sensorimotor cues
would be internal predictions based on efference copies of
motor commands (Synofzik et al., 2013). In dual-task tracking
studies either the middle segment of the tracking path was
repeated or participants were provided with visual guidance
information. Both, implicit motor learning of themiddle segment
and the exploitation of visual information through feed forward
control, improved tracking performance even in the presence
of a secondary auditory detection task and independent of
participants’ awareness (Ewolds et al., submitted). Wolpert and
Flanagan (2001) suggested that predictive control mechanisms
can be best exploited when the environment is predictable, but
that sensorimotor cues are the most useful signal for the system
whenever the environment is unpredictable.
PREDICTION IN UNPREDICTABLE
CONTEXTS
In accordance with predictive coding, prediction is an ongoing
process independent of predictability in the environment, and
people seem to indeed predict upcoming trials even for random
task and stimulus distributions. For instance, in sequence-
learning experiments where tasks were drawn at random but
participants were forced to predict the upcoming task, predicted
tasks were performed faster than upcoming tasks not fulfilling
the prediction (Gaschler et al., 2014). Likewise, task switching
experiments revealed that participants respond faster to stimulus
repetitions in repetition trials compared to repetitions in switch
trials (Altmann, 2011). This effect has recently been ascribed to
a “priming and inhibition” account (Druey, 2014), assuming that
after response activation the corresponding response category is
always inhibited, which leads to slower responses for repetitions
in switch trials. Only if a stimulus in a specific task-set is repeated,
there is an additional priming of the stimulus category, which
outweighs the response inhibition, and enables participants to
respond faster to stimulus repetitions than stimulus switches in
repetition trials.
Furthermore, results of cued task-switching studies by
Horoufchin et al. (2011a,b) demonstrate that participants
predict repetitions of time structures in consecutive trials.
The authors manipulated the duration of response-to-cue-
intervals (RCI) in switch and repetition trials, and analyzed
the effects of short and long RCI depending on whether
they changed from the previous trial. They observed that
participants responded faster in repetition trials compared to
switch trials, and that this repetition advantage was of similar
size for short and long RCIs when the RCI from the previous
trial repeated. If, however, the RCI from the previous trial
changed, the advantage of task repetitions decreased and switch
costs increased. The overall results (especially the lack of RCI
effects with unchanged RCI) were explained by a temporal
distinctiveness account on episodic retrieval, which presumes
that if a similar temporal relation between the previous and
the current RCI exists, task episode of the previous trial can
be retrieved in the current trial and repetition advantages
unfold.
PROSPECTS
As outlined throughout the text, we presuppose automatic
prediction of cues, tasks and stimuli or required responses,
and hope to have convincingly conveyed that prediction
and predictability matter for multitasking performance. Yet,
multitasking studies often either ignore the impact of prediction
or lack a measurement of it, and it is often hard to identify
(and evaluate the role of) trials in which predictions mismatch
the cue and the upcoming task. Thus, a consequence of this
opinion would not only be the consideration of the system’s
predictive nature when conducting multitasking experiments,
but the requirement to change analyses and research designs
beyond core performance measures that capture prediction in
multitasking behavior. We suggest that one way to realize
this could be the implementation of more trial-wise analyses,
because aggregating data over many trials might conceal the
(incremental) impact of predictions. This might be especially
important for settings that require learning or operate with
predictions of varying validity. Further, reinforcing additional
measures like error negativity/positivity would extend classic
measures like reaction times (Alexander and Brown, 2011), which
rather capture after-effects of valid or invalid predictions and
do not adequately reflect core processing of prediction that
occurs prior to stimulus presentation. Taking account of invalid
predictions (e.g., by considering post-error slowing), would
further lead to more nuanced understanding of performance
differences. Other than that, it could be useful to consider people’s
awareness about predictions. Although we presuppose automatic
prediction, there is evidence that making people realize the
automaticity of predictions and actions may lead to deterioration
of performance. For instance, Beilock et al. (2002) showed that
multitasking performance in golf experts suffered when they had
to pay attention to the step-by-step execution of putting, and
attributed this to the intrusion into automatic processes that
ground on well-developed forward models and predictions about
future results of one’s action.
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